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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a method for analyzing the
survivability of distributed network systems and an
example of its application.  Survivability is the capability
of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in
the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents.
Survivability requires capabilities for intrusion resistance,
recognition, and recovery.  The Survivable Network
Analysis (SNA) method permits assessment of
survivability strategies at the architecture level.  Steps in
the SNA method include system mission and architecture
definition, essential capability definition, compromisable
capability definition, and survivability analysis of
architectural softspots that are both essential and
compromisable.  Intrusion scenarios play a key role in the
method.  SNA results are summarized in a Survivability
Map which links recommended survivability strategies for
resistance, recognition, and recovery to the system
architecture and requirements.  This case study
summarizes the application and results of applying the
SNA method to a subsystem of a large-scale, distributed
healthcare system. The study recommended specific
modifications to the subsystem architecture to support
survivability objectives.  Positive client response to study
recommendations suggests that the method can provide
significant added value for ensuring survivability.
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1 NETWORK SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
Survivability Concepts
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Office.
technologies and methods for analyzing and designing
survivable network systems [1, 2, 3].  Survivability is
defined as the capability of a system to fulfill its mission,
in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or
accidents.  Unlike traditional security measures that
require central control and administration, survivability
addresses highly distributed, unbounded network
environments with no central control or unified security
policy.  Survivability focuses on delivery of essential
services and preservation of essential assets, even when
systems are penetrated and compromised. As an emerging
discipline, survivability builds on existing disciplines,
including security [4], fault tolerance [5], and reliability
[6], and introduces new concepts and principles.
Survivability addresses a spectrum of adverse conditions.
In this paper we focus exclusively on attacks, in the
knowledge that our trace-based, compositional methods
are applicable to analysis of failures and accidents as well.
The focus of our survivability research is on delivery of
essential services and preservation of essential assets
during attack and compromise, and timely recovery of full
services and assets following attack.  Essential services
and assets are defined as those system capabilities that are
critical to fulfilling mission objectives.  Survivability in
the presence of attacks depends on three key system
capabilities:  resistance, recognition, and recovery.
Resistance is the capability of a system to repel attacks.
Recognition is the capability to detect attacks as they
occur, and to evaluate the extent of damage and
compromise.  Recovery, a hallmark of survivability, is the
capability to maintain essential services and assets during
attack, limit the extent of damage, and restore full
services following attack.2
STEP 1:
System Definition:
·  Mission requirements definition
·  Architecture definition and elicitation
STEP 2:
Essential Capability Definition:
·  Essential service/asset selection/scenarios
·  Essential component identification
STEP 3:
Compromisable Capability Definition:
·  Intrusion scenario selection
·  Compromisable component identification
STEP 4:
Survivability Analysis:
·  Softspot component (essential and
compromisable) identification
·  Resistance, recognition, and recovery analysis
·  Survivability Map development
Figure 1.  The Survivable Network Analysis Method
The Survivable Network Analysis Method
The Survivable Network Analysis (SNA) method for
assessing and improving the survivability of network
architectures is depicted in Figure 1. The method can be
applied to an existing or proposed system by a small team
of trained evaluators through a structured interaction with
system personnel composed of several meetings and
working sessions.
The method is composed of four principal steps, as
follows.  In step 1, mission objectives and requirements
for a current or candidate system are reviewed, and the
structure and properties of its architecture are elicited.  In
step 2, essential services (services that must be
maintained during attack) and essential assets (assets
whose integrity, confidentiality, availability, and other
properties must be maintained during attack) are
identified, based on mission objectives and consequences
of failure.  Essential service and asset uses are
characterized by usage scenarios.  These scenarios are
mapped onto the architecture as execution traces to
identify the composition of corresponding essential
components (components that must be available to deliver
essential services and maintain essential assets).  In step
3, intrusion scenarios are selected based on the system
environment and assessment of risks and intruder
capabilities.  These scenarios are likewise mapped onto
the architecture as execution traces to identify
corresponding compositions of compromisable
components (components that could be penetrated and
damaged by intrusion).  In step 4, softspot components of
the architecture are identified as components that are both
essential and compromisable, based on the results of steps
2 and 3.  The softspot components and the supporting
architecture are then analyzed for the three key
survivability properties of resistance, recognition, and
recovery.  The analysis of the “three R’s” is summarized
in a Survivability Map.  The map is a two-dimensional
matrix that enumerates, for every intrusion scenario and
corresponding softspot effects, the current and
recommended  architecture strategies for resistance,
recognition, and recovery.  The Survivability Map
provides feedback to the original architecture and system
requirements, and may result in an iterative process of
survivability evaluation and improvement.
2  SENTINEL: THE CASE STUDY SUBSYSTEM
Management of mental health treatment is often
performed as a manual process based on hand-written
forms and informal communication.  As a result,
substantial time and effort are consumed in coordination
of various treatment providers, including physicians,
social service agencies, and healthcare facilities.
CarnegieWorks, Inc. (CWI) is developing a large-scale,
comprehensive management system to automate,
systematize, and integrate multiple aspects of regional
mental health care. The CWI system, named Vigilant, will
ultimately be composed of some 22 subsystems operating
on a distributed network of client and server computers,
and will maintain a large and complex database of patient3
and provider records.  A vital part of the Vigilant system
is development and management of treatment plans.  A
treatment plan is developed for a patient by a provider.
The problems of each patient are identified, together with
a set of goals and actions, including medication and
therapy, to achieve those goals.  Each treatment plan is
carried out by an interdisciplinary and interorganizational
action team composed of providers.  An affiliation is an
organization that provides healthcare services, possibly to
many patients. Treatment plan development and
management and action team definition and coordination
are key functions of the Sentinel subsystem.  As a
subsystem of Vigilant, Sentinel interacts with providers,
affiliations, and other subsystems.  It maintains the action
teams and treatment plans as part of the Vigilant patient
database, and applies regulatory and business rules for
treatment plan development and validation.  Because of
the critical nature of mental health treatment, the need to
conform to regulatory requirements, and the severe
consequences of system failure, survivability of key
Sentinel capabilities has been identified by CWI
personnel as extremely important.
3  APPLYING THE SURVIVABLE NETWORK
ANALYSIS METHOD TO SENTINEL
The SNA method was applied to the Sentinel subsystem
through a structured series of meetings between the SNA
analysis team and Sentinel project personnel (customer
and development team), interleaved with analysis team
working sessions. Specific results of these meetings and
working sessions are summarized below in terms of the
four SNA steps and their artifacts:
Step 1: System Definition
Mission Requirements Definition
The following normal usage scenarios (NUS) elicited
from Sentinel requirements documentation characterize
principal mission objectives of the subsystem.  Each
scenario includes a statement of the primary Sentinel
responsibility with respect to the scenario:
  NUS1: Enter a new treatment plan.  A provider
assigned to a patient admitted into an affiliation
performs an initial assessment and defines a
treatment plan, specifying problems, goals, and
actions.  Sentinel must apply business rules to
treatment plan definition and validation.
  NUS2: Update a treatment plan.   A provider reviews
a treatment plan, possibly adding or changing
problems, goals, or actions, and possibly updating the
status of these items. Sentinel must apply business
rules to treatment plan update and validation.
  NUS3: View a treatment plan.  A provider treating a
patient views a treatment plan to learn the status of
problems, goals, and actions.  Sentinel must ensure
that the plan displayed is current and valid.
  NUS4: Create or modify an action team.  A provider
defines or changes the membership of a treatment
team in an affiliation for a patient.  Sentinel must
ensure that the treatment team definition is current
and correct.
  NUS5: Report the current treatment plans in an
affiliation.  An administrator views the current state
of her affiliation’s treatment of a patient or set of
patients.  Sentinel must ensure that the treatment plan
summaries are current and correct.
  NUS6: Change patient medication. A provider
changes the medication protocol in a treatment plan
for a patient, possibly in response to unforeseen
complications or side effects.  Sentinel must ensure
that the treatment plan is current and valid.
Architecture Definition and Elicitation
The original Sentinel architecture obtained from design
documentation is depicted in simplified form in Figure 2.
Execution traces of the normal usage scenarios identified
in step 1 were used by the evaluation team to illuminate
and understand architectural properties. The traces
revealed component sequencing within the architecture,
as well as reference and update of database artifacts.4
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Figure 2.  Original Sentinel Architecture
Architecture component functions are summarized as
follows:
  User Interface: Resides outside of Sentinel to allow a
single User Interface to serve multiple subsystems
and components.
  API: Provides synchronous RPC and asynchronous
messaging facilities for use by the User Interface and
other system components.
  List Manager: Maintains lists including patients,
affiliations, providers, action teams, and relations
among them.
  Reporting Engine: Provides read-only viewing and
reporting of Sentinel artifacts, including current
treatment plans and their histories.
  Treatment Plan Builder: Creates treatment plans for
patients, including problems, goals, and actions.
  Treatment Plan Validator: Checks the completeness
and consistency of treatment plan development and
modification.
  Action Team Builder: Provides capability to define
and modify action team membership.
  Business Logic: Contains enterprise-defined business
rules, including validation checks for treatment plan
development and logging triggers that manage
change control of sensitive data.
  Database: Sentinel shares access to a common
database with other subsystems and components.
Step 2: Essential Capability Definition
Essential Service/Asset Selection/Scenarios
Essential services and assets represent critical system
capabilities that must survive and be available during
intrusions. Criticality is based on analysis of mission
objectives, risks and consequences of failure, and
availability of alternatives.  Such an analysis may result in
selection of any number of essential services and assets,
and may stratify them into survivability classes of varying
criticality.  The survivability analysis of the Sentinel
subsystem was carried out together with CWI personnel,
and was based on the normal usage scenarios identified in
step 1.  The analysis resulted in selection of a single
essential service, namely, NUS3, the capability to view
treatment plans.  This service, more than any other, was
deemed essential to delivery of mental health treatment
because providers depend on real-time, on-demand access
to treatment plans in clinical situations, particularly in
cases of medication or therapeutic problems of an
emergency or life-critical nature.  The other normal usage5
scenarios could be postponed for hours or even days in
the event of system intrusion and compromise.  The
analysis also identified a single essential asset, namely,
the treatment plans themselves.  Preservation of treatment
plan integrity and confidentiality was deemed essential to
meeting Sentinel mission objectives.  The other Sentinel
artifacts, such as action teams, affiliations, and providers,
could all be reconstructed or updated hours or days after
intrusion with no irreversible consequences.
Essential Component Identification
Essential system components are those components that
participate in delivery of essential services and
preservation of essential assets.  The execution trace of
the NUS3 scenario revealed the reporting engine and the
database components, as well as their supporting
components and artifacts, are essential to maintaining the
capability to perform the scenario.  As essential assets, the
integrity and confidentiality of treatment plans depends
on database components for security and validation.
Step 3: Compromisable Capability Definition
Intrusion Scenario Selection
Based on the system environment and assessment of
intruder objectives and capabilities, the following five
intrusion usage scenarios (IUS) were selected as
representative of the types of attacks to which Sentinel
could be subjected.  The intrusions were selected based on
judgement and experience to illuminate the risks and
vulnerabilities that the essential services could
experience.  In this case, five scenarios were judged
sufficient to cover the exposures; analysis of other
systems could require more or fewer scenarios.  Each
scenario is preceded by an IUS number and type of attack
(shown in parentheses), and followed by a brief
explanation:
  IUS1 (Data Integrity and Spoofing Attack): An
intruder swaps the patient identification of two
validated treatment plans.
  IUS2 (Data Integrity and Insider Attack): An insider
uses other legitimate database clients to modify or
view treatment plans controlled by Sentinel..
  IUS3 (Spoofing Attack): An unauthorized user
employs Sentinel to modify or view treatment plans
by spoofing a legitimate user.
  IUS4 (Data Integrity and Recovery Attack): An
intruder corrupts major portions of the database,
leading to loss of trust in validated treatment plans.
  IUS5 (Insider and Availability Attack): Intruder
destroys or limits access to the Sentinel software so it
cannot be used to retrieve treatment plans.
Compromisable Component Identification
Compromisable system components are those
components that can be accessed and potentially damaged
by intrusion scenarios.  The execution traces of the five
IUS scenarios revealed the following component
vulnerabilities:
  IUS1: This scenario compromises the treatment plan
component. There were no validity checks made on
treatment plans after the initial entry.
  IUS2: This scenario compromises the treatment plan
component. The treatment plan changes  might be
consistent but made by an improper agent.
  IUS3: This scenario compromises the treatment plan
component. The majority of system users would
object to logging into the system repeatedly as a way
to continually monitor the validity of the user. That
assumption could be tolerated for those terminals in
relatively secure locations. The system had not
considered those terminals which were in open areas
easily accessible by unauthorized users.
  IUS4: This scenario compromises the treatment plan
component. Database recovery required higher
priority with respect to operations.
  IUS5:  All software components of the Sentinel
subsystem are affected by this scenario. While there
were implicit user requirements on availability, it had
not been considered in the architecture.
Step 4: Survivability Analysis
Softspot Component Identification
As noted earlier, softspot components are those
components that are both essential and compromisable.
The foregoing analysis shows that the (essential service)
reporting engine component and the (essential asset)
database treatment plan component can both be
compromised in a variety of ways.  The survivability
analysis focuses on the essential services and assets that
these components provide in fulfilling the mission
objectives of the system.
Resistance, Recognition, and Recovery Analysis
Analysis of the three R’s resulted in the Survivability
Map depicted in Table 1(ID stands for identification, TP
for treatment plan, and DB for database).  Development
of the table began by matching each intrusion scenario
trace (created in step 3 above) to the softspot components.
Each trace was first checked for all current resistance
(protection) components in the architecture that would
increase the difficulty experienced by an intruder in
reaching the softspots referenced in the trace.  Because no
detailed implementation information was available to
identify specific vulnerabilities in these resistance
components, an assumption was made that any
vulnerabilities in them would be found and corrected over
time.  The greater the resources available to an intruder,
however, the less time a resistance component will be
completely effective.  The current resistance components6
are described in the resistance column of the Survivability
Map for each scenario.
For the recognition column, a process similar to the
resistance analysis was followed.  To assess the
effectiveness of current recognition components, a
number of assumptions were made and listed in the
Survivability Map.  For example, in scenario IUS3 in
Table 1, there is a documented assumption that a provider
will become suspicious when there are a large number of
denied accesses to treatment plans reported to some party.
If this assumption is not valid, then there are no current
recognition strategies associated with this scenario.
For the recovery column, assumptions were made
regarding common database management facilities
(standard backup and recovery of the database itself and
version control of the Sentinel software).  Table entries
for current recovery strategies included these
assumptions, so that if in fact they are not satisfied in the
final system, the recovery strategy will be less effective
than that described in the Survivability Map.  However,
the assumptions for the current recovery strategies take
into account standard practice with regard to distributed
database systems.
Once all of the current resistance, recognition, and
recovery strategies were identified, gaps and weaknesses
were analyzed for common points in the architecture
where a particular survivability improvement could
address multiple scenarios or multiple strategies. These
high-leverage recommendations are listed in a consistent
form and identified as a common recommendation.  Other
gaps identified by a lack of an existing strategy in any of
the resistance, recognition, or recovery columns were also
addressed.  For the resistance column, recommendations
were made even where an existing resistance mechanism
existed, as this mechanism can be expected to degrade
over time.  Ultimately, it is up to the system architect to
determine the cost-benefit of implementing these
recommendations.  The Survivability Map can help an
architect determine the impact of accepting risks
associated with weaknesses in the resistance, recognition,
or recovery columns, as these are correlated to the
intrusion scenarios that affect the essential services or
assets of the system.  In Table 1, a number of gaps and
assumptions are identified in the current resistance,
recognition, and recovery strategies.  Of particular interest
to an architect are those recommendations that deal with
multiple intrusion scenarios.  For example, adding a
crypto-checksum to the validation of a treatment plan
addresses several scenarios.
The modified architecture resulting from the Survivability
Map analysis is depicted in Figure 3, with additions and
changes shown with dashed lines and shading.  Many of
the recommendations in the survivability map affect the
same architectural component.  To further illustrate the
overlaps, the recommendations are annotated with a
reference number (in this case, {1} to {6}) associated
with the modified architecture.  In this way, it was easy to
determine which of the recommendations addressed
multiple intrusion scenarios.  With limited resources to
mitigate these risks, this view of the recommendations
can help the architect allocate resources to high-impact
modifications of the architecture.  As the modified
architecture was formed to address the recommendations
in the Survivability Map, several natural locations
emerged in the existing architecture where
implementation of the recommendations could be
localized with minimal impact to the overall system.  This
was primarily due to the functional decomposition used in
the original architecture.  It is also likely that the
evaluation of the scenarios led to the formation of
recommendations that were natural to the architecture,
since in executing the scenarios over the architecture, the
impact on individual modules was evident.7
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Figure 3.  Sentinel Architecture with Survivability Modifications8
Intrusion Scenario Resistance Strategy Recognition Strategy Recovery Strategy
Current:
Two passwords are required
for TP access.
Current:
Logging of changes made to DB.
Provider may recognize an
incorrect TP.
Current:
Built-in recovery in commercial DB.
Backup and recovery scheme defined.
IUS1:
Intruder swaps the ID of
two validated TPs.
Recommended:
Implement strong
authentication supported in a
security API layer. {1}
Recommended:
Add crypto-checksum when TP
is validated.{3} Verify crypto-
checksum when TP is retrieved.
{4}
Recommended:
Implement a recovery mode in the
user interface to support searching for
and recovering incorrect TPs. {1}
Current:
Security model for DB field
access.
Current:
None.
Current:
Scrap data and start over, or find an
early backup and verify each entry.
IUS2:
Outside agents exercise
(legitimate) access to
DB fields controlled by
Sentinel.
Recommended:
Need to verify the security
model in light of module
addition and integration.
Recommended:
Perform a validation on access
of a TP for verification. {2}
Add crypto-checksum when TP
is validated.{3} Verify this
checksum when TP is retrieved.
{4}
Recommended:
Scan DB for invalid crypto-
checksums and/or invalid TPs and
recover to last known correct TP. {4}
Current:
None.  No timeout is specified
so that anyone can use a
logged in but vacated
terminal.  However, intruder
only has access to logged in
user’s TPs
Current:
None, except for unusual
number of denied accesses to
TPs as an intruder attempts to
locate particular TPs.
Current:
Can get list of modified TPs through
the spoofed users transaction history.
Manually recover each modified
record.
IUS3:
An unauthorized user
employs Sentinel to
modify or view TPs by
spoofing a legitimate
user.
Recommended:
Add a short logout timeout for
any terminals in uncontrolled
areas (not physician’s offices).
{1}
Recommended:
Add logging, access control, and
illegal access thresholds to the
security API. {1}
Recommended:
Develop a recovery procedure and
support it in the UI. {1}
Current:
Security model in the DB
protects data against
corruption.
Current:
None, except when provider
happens to recognize a corrupted
TP.
Current:
Locate an uncorrupted backup or
reconstruct TPs from scratch.
IUS4:
Intruder corrupts DB
leading to loss of trust
in validated TPs.
Recommended:
Implement live replicated DB
systems that cross check for
validity (supported in many
commercial DB systems).
{5}
Recommended:
Add and check crypto-
checksums on records in the DB.
{3} {4}
Recommended:
Reduce the backup cycle to quickly
rebuild once a corrupted DB is
detected. {5}
Current:
Keep originals available.
Current:
System doesn’t work.
Current:
Reload the system from originals.
IUS5:
Intruder destroys the
Sentinel software so it
cannot be used to
retrieve TPs
Recommended:
Keep a spare CD available for
quick recovery
Recommended:
None.  Easy to detect this one.
Recommended:
Fast recovery from CD.
Create a small sub-system that can
retrieve TPs while Sentinel is down
or being upgraded. {6}
Table 1.  Sentinel Subsystem Survivability Map9
In addition to architectural analysis, these survivability
findings can also be reflected in modifications to Sentinel
requirements.  The Mission Requirements Definition of
step 1 revealed few specific survivability or security
requirements for the Sentinel subsystem, other than
requiring 1) validation of treatment plan data, 2)
utilization of some security features built into the standard
login process and the database, and 3) a development
strategy that would permit easy modification to add
security features.  Changes are needed at the highest level
to two areas of the requirements.  Under survivability
conditions, there is a critical need for providers to view
treatment plans within a reasonable time.  In addition,
there is a need to protect the integrity of the treatment
plans in the database
4  LESSONS LEARNED
The SNA method is under continuing development and
additional case studies are planned. Lessons learned at
this stage focus on the validity of the initial assumptions
and objectives of the method, as well as refinements that
can be explored in future case studies.  The Sentinel case
study began with three assumptions:
  Survivability strategies could be organized in terms
of resistance, recognition, and recovery.
  The analysis should focus on early phases of the life
cycle, specifically, on the mission requirements, as
they represent the essential services and assets of the
system, and on the architecture, as it represents the
components that must be survivable and the strategies
for achieving survivability.
  The application logic rather than the system
infrastructure should bear a significant portion of the
responsibility for implementation of survivability
strategies [7].
The case study supported these assumptions. Organization
of survivability strategies in terms of resistance,
recognition, and recovery was straightforward and easily
communicated to the customer. Identification of essential
services and assets was a critical step in limiting the scope
of the analysis, as well as in reducing the number and
scope of architectural revisions which the customer
should consider. The Sentinel subsystem examined in this
study was just entering its implementation phase; future
studies should include a need to reengineer existing
systems.
The success of the SNA method depends on the
effectiveness of the recommendations, that is,
achievement of a modified system that exhibits improved
survivability.  More specifically, effectiveness depends on
how well the system meets the survivability requirements
selected by the customer in terms of essential services and
assets, given the extent to which the SNA
recommendations are implemented.  It is important to
note that the effectiveness of survivability requirements
can be assessed and measured during implementation
testing, by intentionally failing compromisable
components to simulate the effects of successful
intrusions.  Such testing can provide objective feedback
on the effectiveness of survivability strategies.
Of equal importance is whether the customer can readily
incorporate the SNA recommendations into the existing
software development process, and thus be able to adopt
the suggested changes. Because the survivability
recommendations for Sentinel concentrated on refining an
existing architecture rather than requiring a redesign, they
did satisfy this criterion.
While most of the recommendations focused on revisions
to the application architecture, several suggested changes
in design and implementation or in operations and
procedures to support survivability in the existing
architecture. The study did raise some issues of
extensibility, that is, could the proposed architecture
support the functionality desired in later versions from a
survivability perspective. Analysis of extensibility could
be an important aspect of future studies.  The
recommendations produced in this study were able to take
advantage of existing system features to support
reliability and fault tolerance, such as the transaction
support and recovery mechanisms provided by the
relational database.
The SNA process questions all design choices embodied
in a system architecture.  Of special interest are choices
that could impact survivability in a networked
environment.  For example, a networked application
might include requirements for supporting disconnected
operations by clients, and thus exhibit an architecture
based on a messaging communications model that could
impact post-intrusion recovery.  A future study might
explore how to leverage that type of architectural choice
to better support survivability, in the same way that this
study leveraged survivability capabilities of the relational
database infrastructure.
5  FUTURE PLANS
The SNA method is an effort to say the first word, not the
last word, about the complex problem of assessing
network system survivability.  Much work remains to be
done, including:
·  Development of theory and practice for rigorous
definition of network system behavior and
architecture.
· Addition of rigor to the SNA process through more
formal analysis techniques.
·  Development of a canonical set of intrusion scenarios
that embody current knowledge of attack strategies.10
·  Integration of risk analysis and management
techniques into the SNA method.
·  Development of survivability metrics and measures
of success.
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